Posts Tagged ‘Chapter 11 Restructuring’

Did you know you might not really have an ownership interest?

July 2011

Inadequate and defective documentation of ownership interest in a business is an all too common feature of closely held businesses and, after a dispute arise, litigation over an assert claim by adversely effected business partner’s standing (right) to sue is challenged.

The reasons for this state of affairs are many and diverse, e.g.:

  • The owners lack a sophisticated understanding of the legal formalities involved in an ownership interest in the chosen form of business entity.
  • The owners are unable or unwilling to spend the money for necessary legal and accounting services.
  • The owners are family members or long-time friends who trust one another and believe they don’t need any written agreement or certification of ownership interests.

These circumstances should not deter you from investing in the required documentation. Make sure you get the proper documentation and protect your interest.

Sidney Turner

www.SidneyTurnerllc.com

 

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Number ONE of the Six Major Points Series

July 2011

People have asked me to explain what I do and what it means.

I handle corporate workouts, reorganizations and dissolutions and other types of disputes among co-owners of privately owned companies, in other words I advise clients when they are experiencing adverse business situations.

But what does it really mean to be a business lawyer handling dissolution and other types of disputes among co-owners or adverse business situations? Does it require a special temperament and skill set? Here’s my take on the answers to these questions:

It Means understanding business and the relationships that make it work.

There are Six Major Points Series I will cover over the next few blogs. Starting with

 

Number ONE of the Six Major Points Series

It Means supporting the Client through this difficult time. It’s called adverse business situation for a reason. A relationship is being torn asunder in the breakup of a business partnership. It’s not just about money. It’s about the inter-personal grievances, resentments, antagonisms, affections, disappointments, jealousies, and innumerable other emotions that attach to people with close relationships whose common interests have diverged to a critical point. The emotions can run even higher when it’s a family-owned business. The client’s need for support and guidance, on top of the uncertainties surrounding the future of the business in which the client’s self-identity is wrapped, puts a premium on the lawyer’s accessibility, empathy and ability to give on-the-spot advice and reassurance. These qualities in a business lawyer are particularly important because, business dissolution is highly dynamic. By that I mean, the now-adverse business partners, who often have to continue working together and make business decisions while simultaneously engaging in mutual mud-slinging, require constant input from legal counsel to assist with a daily stream of new issues.

If you missed any please check out my other blog postings

Sidney Turner

www.SidneyTurnerllc.com

 

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Sam Zell’s buyout ‘among the worst in American corporate history

April 2011

Tribune creditors allege that Sam Zell’s buyout was ‘among the worst in American corporate history.

When you get to greedy it can come back and bite you.

It would force shareholders to give back money gained from simply selling their shares into a corporate buyout offer, based on the theory that the deal was so fundamentally flawed that it amounted to a fraud that should never have happened.

Creditors are going after the shareholders under a legal concept known as “fraudulent transfer.”  A similar concept the Madoff trustee is using to recover monies paid out to investors. The theory allows creditors to argue that the banks financing Tribune’s buyout and the shareholders who cashed out should have known the deal would destroy the company. As a result, the argument goes, the banks shouldn’t be allowed to recoup their loans and the shareholders should have to give back money they received.

Enjoy the Article below

Sidney Turner

www.SidneyTurnerllc.com

[tribune]

Sam Zell‘s top-of-the-market buyout of Tribune Co. cashed out shareholders about a year before the media company tumbled into bankruptcy protection. Now, those former holders are bracing for a possible barrage of litigation aimed at clawing back more than $8 billion in payouts.

If successful, any litigation would represent an unprecedented legal development, some lawyers said. It would force shareholders to give back money gained from simply selling their shares into a corporate buyout offer, based on the theory that the deal was so fundamentally flawed that it amounted to a fraud that should never have happened. Under the best-case scenario, creditors likely would get back only between $2 billion and $3 billion, the amount necessary to make unsecured creditors whole.

While most lawyers said such cases are difficult to prove, former shareholders are girding for the worst, in some instances talking with lawyers and investors about plans to sock away money in anticipation of any litigation.

Creditors are going after the shareholders under a legal concept known as “fraudulent transfer.” The theory allows creditors to argue that the banks financing Tribune’s buyout and the shareholders who cashed out should have known the deal would destroy the company. As a result, the argument goes, the banks shouldn’t be allowed to recoup their loans and the shareholders should have to give back money they received.

In certain instances, merely demonstrating a company was insolvent at the time of a leveraged buyout can leave deal participants exposed.

Tribune

Tribune

Hedge fund Stark Investments, one of Tribune’s biggest investors prior to the 2007 buyout, already has begun setting aside money in anticipation of a settlement or judgment, said people familiar with the matter.

Others on Wall Street are hunting for new ways to profit from it.

Prime-brokerage executives at Deutsche Bank AG are in discussions about setting up an operation through the distressed-debt trading desk that would match buyers and sellers of bankruptcy claims related to the shareholder litigation, said a person familiar with the matter. While banks have set up such market-making operations for creditors’ claims, the possibility that shareholders could have to cough up payments expands the market for trading claims.

Deutsche Bank’s prime-brokerage business caters to dozens of hedge funds that could want to bet on the probability that claims against shareholders will succeed, an opportunity one bank executive called “creative thinking” by the bank.

In the lawsuit filed in Delaware bankruptcy court last year, Tribune creditors allege that Mr. Zell’s buyout was “among the worst in American corporate history.” The creditors’ complaint said an unnamed engineer of the deal likened it to “carrying a fat person up [Mount] Everest, hopefully it doesn’t kill us.” The lawsuit was filed by Tribune’s official committee of unsecured creditors, which serves as a watchdog in the bankruptcy case and represents bondholders and a variety of other creditors.

Tribune declined to comment. Jon Wasserman, general counsel for Mr. Zell’s Equity Group Investments, said the bankruptcy examiner found no evidence that Mr. Zell acted in bad faith.

Hedge funds, mutual funds, former Tribune executives and even family trusts and a large foundation are ensnared in the suit. The deal swelled the company’s debt to roughly $13 billion before Tribune was forced to seek bankruptcy protection.

Aurelius Capital Management LP, a large Tribune bondholder, recently said in bankruptcy court that it also could go after shareholders in state courts to disgorge payouts from the deal.

“Former Tribune shareholders likely face a daunting task in defending their receipt of proceeds from the mountain of debt used to finance this deal,” said Bill Welnhofer, managing director and head of restructuring at investment bank Robert W. Baird & Co. in Chicago. “The company’s business model had already started showing signs of weakening.”

The owner of the Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, Baltimore Sun and several television stations used more than $11 billion in debt financing from several Wall Street banks to back the deal and pay off existing shareholders, money some creditors believe belongs to them.

A bankruptcy-court examiner last summer found it “highly likely” that Tribune was “rendered insolvent and without adequate capital” as a result of the deal. The examiner, Kenneth Klee, said some financial projections made by Tribune management as the deal neared closing were too rosy and bore the “earmarks of a conscious effort” to make the company’s financial condition appear better so the buyout could be completed. The examiner found Mr. Zell didn’t act in bad faith.

Tribune’s reorganization plan would shield the lending banks, including J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Citigroup Inc., Bank of America Corp. and the former Merrill Lynch & Co., which is now owned by BofA, from any future litigation. In exchange, the banks have agreed to pay money to bondholders that those creditors wouldn’t normally receive in a bankruptcy. Shareholders and some former Tribune executives, though, remain exposed. The banks declined to comment.

Courts have generally held that shareholders aren’t liable in leveraged buyouts that later collapse unless the case involves actual fraud with evidence that shows clear intent, said Richard Levin, a bankruptcy lawyer at Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP.

“It’s tough to prove actual intent because there usually is not a smoking gun,” he said. “Usually, these deals are driven by an intent to make a good business deal, not harm existing creditors.”

For Stark, the potential litigation exacerbates an already precarious position. In 2007, Stark managed $13 billion for investors. But it suffered investment losses in 2008 and some of the worst client withdrawals in the industry, leaving it with $3 billion now, with investors still waiting for several hundred million dollars more in redemptions that haven’t yet been paid, said people close to the matter.

Stark has told clients that the Tribune bankruptcy “could get messier,” and the hedge-fund firm is being conservative by holding back money, said one person familiar with the matter.

Other large former shareholders targeted by Tribune creditors include the Chandler family, among Tribune’s largest owners at the time of the buyout, and the McCormick and Cantigy foundations. The trio held at least a third of Tribune’s shares and reaped more than $2 billion in the buyout, according to creditors.

Tribune’s former chief executive, Dennis FitzSimons, also is targeted.

Representatives for the Chandlers didn’t respond to requests for comment. The foundations declined to comment. Mr. FitzSimons, also the McCormick foundation’s board chairman, declined to comment.

Write to Mike Spector at mike.spector@wsj.com, Jenny Strasburg atjenny.strasburg@wsj.com and Shira Ovide at shira.ovide@wsj.com

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Philadelphia Orchestra Makes Bankruptcy Move

April 2011

The troubled Philadelphia Orchestra said on contemplating Chapter 11

“It gives us a better chance of raising the investment funds that are needed to revitalize this orchestra over the next five years,” Richard Worley, the board chairman, said of a Chapter 11 filing. “We need a fresh start. We need to escape contractual entanglements that we cannot possibly afford.”

This is a clear view and appreciation of the scope  a chapter 11 reorganization can accomplish in untangling a business model that once may have worked but no longer does.

Enjoy the Article below

Sidney Turner

Philadelphia Orchestra Makes Bankruptcy Move

By DANIEL J. WAKIN and FLOYD NORRIS

Published: April 17, 2011

PHILADELPHIA — A humbled Philadelphia Orchestra drew a prolonged ovation on Saturday evening after the final strains of Mahler’s Symphony No. 4, one of his sunniest works. Just hours earlier, its board of directors had voted to send the orchestra to bankruptcy court, declaring the move the only way to survive financial disaster.

The vigorous applause was certainly for Mahler, but it also seemed to be a vote of support for a beleaguered hometown team.

Philadelphia is not New York, with its abundance of musical organizations, said Mindy Pressel of Cherry Hill, N.J., who was in the audience: “This is what we have here for concerts.” Some in the audience took out their frustrations on orchestra executives. “They’re in trouble because of poor management,” said Edward Neifeld of Maple Glen, Pa., who wore a red Phillies sweatshirt.

Inside the orchestra’s Kimmel Center home, there were many empty seats — possibly the result of a thunderstorm, though also indicative of a reason the orchestra is having financial trouble. In a program insert given to the audience on Saturday, management also blamed its eroded endowment, not enough donations, “operational costs,” the expense of financing its musicians’ pensions and the cost of vendor contracts.

It praised the musicians for their sacrifices, pleaded for donations and urged the audience to buy tickets. “If you care, please do not abandon our orchestra now — embrace us,” the handout said.

The decision to file Chapter 11 bankruptcy has sent ripples through the country’s major orchestras, many of which are struggling with money. Several, like Philadelphia, are also facing contract negotiations with their musicians. Allison Vulgamore, the Philadelphia Orchestra’s president and chief executive, sent a memo last week to executives of other major orchestras alerting them to Saturday’s vote.

While orchestras have resorted to bankruptcy court in the past, none have been of the caliber of the Fabulous Philadelphians — an internationally famous ensemble that was the first American orchestra to visit China and counts Leopold Stokowski and Eugene Ormandy as past music directors. It is as much a national treasure as a local one.

The orchestra said that it had cash to pay the bills for only two more months and that the gap this season between what it has to pay to operate and what it earns is $13 million. Emergency fund-raising is expected to bring that down to $5 million, management officials said, but that would cover only this season.

The trustees voted overwhelmingly in favor of a filing, with only the five musicians on the board opposing. The musicians contend that management is exaggerating the situation and that filing for bankruptcy will undermine the orchestra’s quality and discourage donors.

After the vote, Ms. Vulgamore said the board felt heavily the weight of tradition. “But we also talked about wanting to see our future and taking the necessary steps to get there to it.”

She said the musicians would still be paid and concerts would continue, but the orchestra would review all contracts with its business partners — especially the Kimmel Center, where it pays rent. It will come up with a reorganization plan to be approved by a bankruptcy judge and will continue to negotiate with the musicians over a new contract.

Richard Worley, the board’s chairman, said in an interview that the orchestra hoped to emerge from Chapter 11 “by later this year.” He said the atmosphere during the vote was emotional. “Not every eye was dry throughout the morning.”

John Koen, a cellist and chairman of the players committee, spoke from the stage on Saturday, thanking the audience members for their support and announcing that the musicians would offer a special expression of gratitude: the heart-warming “Nimrod” movement from Elgar’s “Enigma” Variations. Its mood reflected a more hopeful outcome than another work on the program — music from Berg’s opera “Lulu,” in which the protagonist dies a tawdry death at the hands of Jack the Ripper.

Mr. Norris contributed reporting from Philadelphia and Mr. Wakin from New York.

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INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY

February 2010

I.  Policy behind Chapter 11

1. To provide a “fresh start” for economically viable debtors;

2. To promote equality of distribution among similarly situated creditors;

3. To concentrate the activities of judgment creditors into a single court of broad and exclusive federal jurisdiction;

4. To provide “breathing space” to a debtor, permit a structured process outside of a quick liquidation to enhance asset values, and a determination by creditor classes of a “plan” for the distribution of the value of those assets.

 

When is Chapter 11 useful?

1. To provide an opportunity for financially troubled but economically viable company to restructure and continue operations, either under new ownership or a new financial structure, or by removing debt impediments to viability such as ruinous unsecured debt or disastrous contracts; or

2. To provide an orderly liquidation of a failed business that possesses assets that will have an enhanced value if sold for their “going concern” value or that need to be marketed through a special process, or that would benefit from the retention of current management and continuing operations throughout the liquidation process.

 

When is it not useful?

1. To postpone the death of an irretrievably failed business that lacks significant salvageable assets;

2. To halt a foreclosure entirely upon speculative hope that something will turn up in a few weeks;

3. To escape the oppressive terms of a secured lender with a blanket lien on all business assets (except in a few rare instances);

4. When a consensual workout or an assignment for the benefit of creditors in state court would work and is the less costly alternative.

 

Use of bankruptcy as a sales vehicle

1. Under § 363 (f) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor may sell property of the bankruptcy estate free and clear of liens, claims and encumbrances, subject to certain restrictions. This allows debtor to make assets more marketable by severing third party claims and cleaning title.

2. Under certain conditions, a bankruptcy court can also, pursuant to § 363 (f), permit the debtor to sell property for which the debtor holds only a partial interest or where the debtor’s interests are contested by a third party.

 

II. First Steps in a Chapter 11 Case

Petition and Initial Filings

A chapter 11 case is commenced by filing a petition. The petition consists of an official form (or a document that substantially conforms to the official form) that requires the debtor to estimate the amount of its assets and liabilities. The required initial filings also include a list o the top 20 creditors and their addresses, parties with whom the debtor has executory (existing) contracts and leases, a corporate resolution authorizing the filing (if the debtor is a corporation) and an attorney’s verified statement disclosing the attorney’s fee arrangement.  A matrix of creditor addresses is also often required under the bankruptcy jurisdiction’s local rules.

Often filed initially, however, not required to be, are the schedules listing all secured and unsecured creditors, their potential claims, and the debtor’s assets and a list of equity security holders. Finally, a statement of financial affairs (called the “SOFA”) is required to be filed, a form document of some length that provides for a more detailed view of the debtor’s finances and situation regarding such things as litigation and property transfers pre-petition.

 

“First Day Motions”

Because the bankruptcy process initiated by the bankruptcy petition places the debtor under court supervision and restricts its ability to operate its business, a debtor must in the first instance obtain court permission to operate realistically. So-called “first day motions” are not necessarily filed the first day, but with an operating business they are often required to be filed and heard by the bankruptcy court as soon as possible, if not, in fact, the first day. Typical first day motions include:

 1. Employee Wages

2. Cash Collateral

3. Debtor in Possession (“DIP”) Financing

4. Retention Motions

5. Utilities

 

III. Small Business Debtor v. Non-Small Business Debtor

A small business bankruptcy case is a chapter 11 case involving a small business debtor, whom the Bankruptcy Code defines as a person engaged in commercial or business activities other than owning or operating real estate with debt no greater than (as of December 28, 2009) $2.19 million, not including debt to insiders and affiliates.

All chapter 11 debtors must attend meetings and timely file schedules and tax returns and allow the UST to inspect its books, but the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code added other obligations for the small business debtor. One theme of the small business amendments is that creditors deserve more and better information, presented in understandable and recognizable formats. Many sections of the small business amendments were framed with this goal in mind. As a result, small business debtors must file balance sheets, income statements, and cash flow statements with the petition, or state under penalty of perjury that none exist.

Small business debtors can receive only a 30 day extension of its time to file schedules and statement of financial affairs. In a small business case, the United States Trustee is required to conduct an initial interview with the small business debtor before the Section 341 meeting. Senior management and counsel are required to the initial debtor interview, as well as scheduling conferences and meetings of creditors.

 

IV. Leases and Executory Contracts

1. Leases

Section 365(d) (4) requires a debtor to assume or reject a lease of non-residential real property within 120 days of the petition date or the lease will be rejected. The court upon motion may extend the deadline an additional 90 days. No additional extension is permitted accept with the written approval of the landlord. The deadline may force a debtor to make premature decisions as to its future needs related to subject real estate, since, not atypically, a Chapter 11 debtor may not have its financing in place or its plan formulated (particularly if it turns on settlement of litigation) by the 210 day deadline.

In large retail cases, where there may be dozens of leases and sites to analyze, this requirement may be particularly burdensome. Leases may be rejected, assumed, or assumed and assigned, in accordance with the rules discussed below for executory contracts.

 

2. Executory Contracts

Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a debtor with authority to assume or reject an executory contract subject to court approval. In re Carlisle Homes, Inc., 103 B.R. 524, 534 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1988) the court explained: The purpose of § 365 is, in part, to enable the debtor to take advantage of favorable agreements that benefit the estate. The Bankruptcy Code does not define “executory contract.” The legislative history of § 365, however, is instructive as to the meaning of the term in the bankruptcy context. An executory contract is one on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides.

Upon rejection, the debtor must pay “rejection damages”, consisting of damages for breach of the contract, however, despite the fact the contract is rejected after the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the claim is as a general unsecured pre-petition claim and thus subjected to the limitations of any pro rata distributions to unsecured creditors. A debtor may also assume a favorable contract, and obligate itself to pay a “cure amount” and provide adequate assurance of future performance. Cure amounts are paid in full amount as a current obligation.

With some exceptions, a debtor may also assume and assign (i.e. sell) a favorable contract to a third party, subject to court approval. In such instances, the third party pays the cure amount and provides the adequate assurance of future performance. With both executory contracts and leases, upon assumption, the debtor is required to meet post-assumption obligations under those contracts and leases as those obligations come due.

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Debt is the New Equity

September 2009

Debt is the new Equity in Bankruptcy Court
Entrepreneurs Find Action Now in Chapter 11; Debt Is the New Equity.

Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganizations have emerged as the hottest venue for quickly buying, trading and breaking up companies.

Bankruptcy is built around the idea of reorganization where cash-strapped firms enter court and often spend, years paying off creditors and attracting new financing. Now, with that financing in short supply, companies are rushing to hash out deals in weeks and months. That is reshaping traditional deal making and restructuring. The number of prearranged bankruptcy plans – which receive significant creditor blessing before entering court should increase significantly in 2009. Meanwhile, the numbers of asset sales directly out of bankruptcy court are well ahead of last year’s pace.

For example Masonite International Inc., a debt-laden door maker once controlled by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., entered bankruptcy court in mid-March. Three months later it has new owners and virtually no debt.

‘The traditional stand-alone reorganization is on the endangered species list due to the lack of financing, so the acquisition in bankruptcy is much more prevalent now. General Motors Corp.’s fast-paced strategy to sell its desirable assets to a “New GM” while its more-onerous assets wind down in bankruptcy court.

So many situations are dire, like with retailers, that there need to be quick solutions; stakeholders have to have a reorganization plan in place even prior to the company’s Chapter 11 filing. Masonite chief executive has been quoted as saying the company is poised to use its clean balance sheet to make acquisitions. Whenever you can de-lever the way we have through Chapter 11, it clearly puts you in a position to be on the offensive.

In other cases, investors are acquiring company assets in so-called 363 bankruptcy sales, which are named after a section of the Bankruptcy Code. In such sales, companies quickly auction assets and leave many liabilities behind. That makes the assets attractive to new owners. These auctions can raise legal challenges, with sellers accused of using the sale as a substitute for a reorganization plan requiring creditors’ endorsement. But bankruptcy lawyers have generally cited such sales as “bulletproof,” because they are difficult to undo once approved by a judge.

Debt is the new equity. There are tremendous opportunities for investors to really take control of, or purchase, companies at a very good price.

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Chrysler’s sale, under section 363, of substantially all of its assets raise many questions

June 2009

Chrysler Group LLC’s restructuring may change the way bankruptcy reorganizations play out in the future. Within days of a bankruptcy court approval of the plan to sell Chrysler assets to Fiat SpA and leave secured creditors holding their debt, the National Hockey League’s Phoenix Coyotes attempted the same 363 strategy in trying to rush a sale of the team. The judge did not approve the attempt to allow the Coyotes to be sold quickly, citing that there was no emergency as the NHL was underwriting the team for the foreseeable future. Had the court done so, it would have denied creditors the kind of input typically afforded them under bankruptcy law.

Bankruptcy and financial professionals have speculated that such scenarios where the expected outcome of the application of rules of law could make investors and lenders demand higher interest rates on debt given the uncertainty over how they might fare should the borrower encounter financial difficulties.

The concern is that lenders have factored certain expectations of identifiable events happening having a predictable result based on precedent of rules and laws.

How are investment decisions to be made and quantified when lenders are faced with bankruptcy courts that appear to disregard the rules? Are such arguments for speed a short-term concern that likely will not be followed when the financial crisis ends? Chrysler maintains that it used established bankruptcy procedures, and that extraordinary measures were needed during the unprecedented economic crises.

Lawyers who represent secured creditors fear the Chrysler precedent could be used to allow companies to get around established procedures for reorganizations which require negotiations and creditor vote approving a plan of reorganization.

At issue with Chrysler was a procedure called a “363 sale,” which refers to a section of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code which allows the court to approve a sale assets without the approval of creditors. Such sales are typically used to sell a single or group of asset(s) in bankruptcy proceedings, such as a building that needs to be sold quickly to maximize its value, and can be done without creditor approval. Creditors claim Chrysler used the procedure to effect a restructure of the entire company, not just a single or group of asset(s).

Lawyers are citing these examples in the name of speed, claiming emergency circumstances. The question remains how these impact future attempts at 363 sales will.

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